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FEDERAL JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE SYMPOSIUM

Introduction to Mercer Law
Review Symposium on Federal
Judicial Independence
by L. Ralph Mecham'
I thank the Mercer Law Review for the opportunity to write this
Introduction and for publishing an edition on Federal Judicial Independence. This symposium presents a forum for academicians and for
representatives of the three branches of government to discuss a subject
which is fundamental to the constitutional concept of separation of
powers. Each author brings a unique perspective and philosophy to a
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dialogue that is essential to the constructive development of good
government.
John Jay, the first Chief Justice of the United States, when commenting upon the debate surrounding the formation of the federal judiciary,
observed that "A judicial Controul, general & final, was indispensable.
The Manner of establishing it, with Powers neither too extensive, nor too
limited; rendering it properly independent, and yet properly amenable,
involved Questions of not little Intricacy."'
More than two hundred years later, the parameters of judicial
independence continue to be questioned and debated. The contemporary
debate on judicial independence does not concern whether federal judges
should be independent, but rather, the nature and extent of that
independence. In an attempt to define the concept of judicial independence, one judge has recently opined:
Judicial independence is a judge's ability to decide a case free from
pressures or inducements. Judicial independence has an institutional
character, which is best seen in our constitutional separation of powers.
It has an individual character, which is partially protected by the
Constitution in the provisions for life tenure and the guarantee of no
diminishment of salary, but which extends further to encompass those
conditions in which and under which a judge decides the cases. These
ancillary elements of individual judicial independence, including
security, facilities, support, workload, rules of procedure, and case
management, normally do not impact upon judicial independence but
under extreme circumstances may do so.
Judicial independence is important not only to the judicial system. The
independence of the judiciary must be credible to those being judged.
Therefore, the exercise ofjudicial power requires institutional arrangewill instill confidence that the power is being properly
ments which
2
applied.
I consider an independent judiciary to be the cornerstone of a free
society and the rule of law. My recent experiences with judges and court
administrators from China and from emerging democracies have
reinforced my fundamental belief that without a judiciary that operates
independently, yet accountable to the public and political branches of the

1. Maeva Marcus &Natalie Wexler, "The Judiciary Act of 1789: Political Compromise
or Constitutional Interpretation?" Maeva Marcus, Ed., Origins of the FederalJudiciary3
(1992) quoting John Jay's Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District
of New York, April 12, 1790.

2. Memorandum dated April 22, 1994, from Judge Jane R. Roth (3d Cir.) to Steven M.
Tevlowitz, Counsel to the Committee on the Judicial Branch. The memorandum is on file
with the author in the records of the Judicial Conference Committee on the Judicial Branch
Subcommittee on Judicial Independence.
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government, the rights of citizens under a constitution go unchecked,
development of the economy flounders, and powers associated with
military dictatorships flourish. We are so fortunate to live in a country
under a written constitution that has survived over two hundred years.
To me, it is obvious that the preservation ofjudicial autonomy is integral
to the strength of our democracy.
The founders of the republic recognized that it was difficult to define
the extent to which the judiciary should be independent. Judges were
expected to be final arbiters who followed the letter of the law; they were
also expected to be independent and impartial.3 Chief Justice Jay
observed that the Judiciary Act of 1789-which liteially created the
American federal judiciary-did not resolve every question surrounding
the powers of the third branch.4
These conflicting values remain contemporary concerns. One cannot
have separate branches unless they are independent of each other. Yet
independence is also a relative concept; a branch is only independent of
another branch for certain purposes or to some degree. Given the
tradition of shared, as well as separate powers in our Constitution,
independence is often countered by interdependence.,
The Chief Justice, in his 1994 report on the federal judiciary, focused
on the interdependence between the judicial and legislative branches.
This dependence illustrates the "delicate relationship among the
dispersed powers of the Constitution.
Article III of the Constitution vests the judicial power of the United
States in the Supreme Court and in such other federal courts as
Congress may create. It grants to Article III judges two significant
protections of their independence: they have tenure during good
behavior, and their compensation may not be diminished during their
term of office. But federal courts are heavily dependent upon Congress
for virtually every other aspect of their being.7

3. Gerhard Casper, "The Judiciary Act of 1789 and Judicial Independence," Maeva
Marcus, Ed., Origins of the FederalJudiciary 285 (1992).
4. See supra note 1.
5. Paul R. Verkuil, Separation of Powers, The Rule of Law and the Idea of Independence, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 301, 322 (1989). In a concurrence to a seminal opinion of
the 1950s, Justice Jackson stated: "While the Constitution diffuses power the better to
secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into
a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence,
autonomy but reciprocity." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
6. William H. Rehnquist, 1994 Year-end Report on the Fed. Judiciary 1 (December 30,
1994).
7. Id. at 1-2.
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The Chief Justice noted that Congress authorizes every individual
judgeship in the federal system and establishes the level of judicial
compensation. The jurisdiction of the federal courts is determined by
Congress. Federal question jurisdiction, which today is the basis for so
much litigation in the federal courts, was not conferred upon these
courts by Congress until 1875. Congress is also responsible for
establishing the substantive law and procedure to be applied in federal
courts.8
For the first century of our existence under the Constitution, Congress
legislated relatively little, but beginning with the Interstate Commerce
Act of 1887, Congress began to enact more and more federal statutes
applicable in federal courts.
Congress also has authority to regulate the Rules of Procedure to be
used in the federal courts. For many years it exercised that authority
directly, but the Rules Enabling Act enacted sixty years ago delegated
that authority to the courts. Amendments to the existing Rules of
Procedure today are first recommended by the Rules Committees, and
then presented first to the Judicial Conference and then to the
Supreme Court. Those which survive this process are laid before
Congress, and -go into effect unless disapproved. I believe that this
system has worked well ....

9

The federal judiciary is also dependent upon appropriation of money
by Congress for all of its day-to-day operations. The payment of salaries
of judicial officers and employees, payment of jurors, and supplies are
made with funds appropriated by Congress.'
The Chief Justice further observed:
Thus when we examine the relationship of the federal judiciary to
Congress, we see two branches of the federal government which are
constitutionally separate, but whose ongoing functioning is steeped in
interdependence. n
Since 1985, I have been Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts. My appointment is from the Supreme Court of
the United States, but because of a recent statutory change,U my
successor will be approved by the Chief Justice after consultation with

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 2.
Id. at 3-4.
Id.
Id. at 4.
28 U.S.C. § 601.
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the Judicial Conference of the United States' -- the policymaking body
of the Federal Judiciary. As Director, I am supervised and directed by
the Judicial Conference. Implicit in my appointment is the ability of the
judiciary to name an administrative officer. This autonomy over the
administrative affairs of the judicial branch is a fundamental element
of institutional judicial independence and promotes the decisional
autonomy of individual judges.
As Director, one of my'principal responsibilities is serving as Secretary
to the Judicial Conference, which has twenty working committees. At
the request of the district judges of the Fourth Circuit, the Judicial
Conference asked its Committee on the Judicial Branch to study the
concept of judicial independence. Under the leadership of its former
chair, Tenth Circuit Judge Deanell Reece Tacha, the Judicial Branch
Committee established a Subcommittee on Judicial Independence. 4
Judge Tacha has worked tirelessly to enhance the ability of judges to
Her article,
deliver the' finest-quality decisionmaking possible.
"Independence of the Judiciary for'the Third Century," ' follows. In it,
she discusses judges' concerns about perceived erosion of judicial
independence by describing some of the characteristics of individual
(professional) independence and what independence means for the
judiciary as a whole.
The strength of the federal judiciary today is not only attributable to
the men and women who work in the judicial branch, but also to
members of Congress who throughout the history of the republic have
safeguarded the independence of the third branch. As Chairman of the
Committee on the Judiciary, Senator Orrin G. Hatch (R-Utah) shares his
views on interbranch relations in his article, "Congress and the Courts:
Establishing a Constructive Dialogue."' 6 He examines the different

13. Congress created the Judicial Conference in 1922. Then it was known as the
Conference of Senior Circuit Judges. In 1948, the name "The Judicial Conference of the
United States" was created by law. Its enabling legislation is found at 28 U.S.C. § 331.
The Chief Justice is the presiding officer.
14. Members of the Subcommittee on Judicial Independence included: Judges Randall
R. Rader (Fed. Cir.), Chair, Glen E. Clark (Bankr. Utah), Michael M. Mihm (C.D. Il.), Fred
I. Parker (2d Cir.), James A. Redden (D. Or.), Jane R. Roth (3d Cir.), and Dennis W. Shedd
(D.S.C.). Judge Tacha's charge to the Subcommittee included examining both the external
and internal pressures that impact upon the judiciary to maintain its independence and
exercise discretion. See letter of August 13, 1993, from Judge Deanell Reece Tacha (10th
Cir.) to Judge Randall R. Rader (Fed. Cir.) on file with the author in the records of the
Judicial Conference Committee on the Judicial Branch.
15. Deanell Reece Tacha, Independence of the Judiciary for the Third Century, 46
MERCER L. REV. 645 (1995).

16.

Orrin G. Hatch, Congressand the Courts: Establishinga ConstructiveDialogue,46

MERCER L. REv. 661 (1995).
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meanings that judicial independence has and welcomes the opportunity
for a constructive dialogue with the judiciary over its future course in
carrying out the jurisdiction that Congress grants the federal courts and
its administrative operations.
Also discussing the subject of interbranch relations are Harvey
Rishikof and Professor Barbara A. Perry. They have analyzed hundreds
of instances where federal jurists have testified before congressional
committees on subjects such as court administration, federal jurisdiction,
and budgetary policy. Their article, "Separateness but Interdependence,
Autonomy but Reciprocity: A First Look at Federal Judges' Appearances
Before Legislative Committees"17 reviews these appearances and offers
possible explanations for this marked increase in the modem era. They
conclude with a discussion of the impact of this phenomenon on
separation of powers.
Professor Martin H. Redish assisted the Subcommittee on Judicial
Independence by examining the parameters of judicial independence. In
"Federal Judicial Independence: Constitutional and Political Perspectives,"' Professor Redish suggests that judicial independence reflects
a balancing of accountability with the need to curb democratic excesses.
He focuses on certain court decisions, such as those upholding the
constitutionality of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, that have limited
what some judges believe are matters affecting judicial autonomy. For
example, after considering Professor Redish's analysis, one judge on the
Subcommittee opined that perhaps the judiciary was eroding its own
independence.
Court decisions eroding federalism and separation of powers have
contributed greatly to what some might see as a threat to judicial
independence. I am starting to believe a large part of our "problem"
has been created by us. In fact, our constitutional protections are
limited to what the Supreme Court says the Constitution is.' 9
Professor Linda S. Mullenix responds to Professor Redish in her
article, "Judicial Power and The Rules Enabling Act."' She asserts

17. Harvey Rishikof & Barbara A. Perry, Separatenessbut Interdependence,Autonomy
but Reciprocity: A First Look at Federal Judges' Appearances Before Legislative
Committees, 46 MERCER L. REv. 667 (1995).
18. Martin H. Redish, Federal Judicial Independence: Constitutional and Political
Perspectives,46 MERCER L. REV. 697 (1995).
19. Letter of May 25, 1994, from Judge Dennis W. Shedd (D.S.C.) to Judge Randall R.
Rader (Fed. Cir.). On file with the author in the records of the Judicial Conference
Committee on the Judicial Branch Subcommittee on Judicial Independence.
20. Linda S. Mullenix, JudicialPowerand The Rules EnablingAct, 46 MERCER L. REV.
733 (1995).
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that "Congressional intrusion into federal procedural rulemaking is the
most significant contemporary issue of judicial independence." 1
Professor Mullenix argues that if the third branch is to be truly
independent of the legislature, then procedural rulemaking should be left
to the judiciary's discretion. She discusses the federal rulemaking
process and its impact on the judiciary's ability to have decisional
neutrality as a significant facet of branch autonomy.
Also discussing the rulemaking process are Professors Erwin
Chemerinsky and Barry Friedman. In "The Fragmentation of Federal
Rules,' s they contend that today's national uniform rulemaking process
has been jeopardized in a movement towards localism. Chemerinsky and
Friedman examine the effects of the Civil Justice Reform Act and the
1993 amendments on the procedural rulemaking process. They argue
that the Federal Rules of Procedure should be the rules for all.
Judge James Zagel and Adam Winkler examine the psychology of
judicial independence in their article, "The Independence of Judges."'
Judge Zagel has recently completed a term on the Judicial Conference
Committee on the Codes of Conduct. Thus, the article reflects the
importance of accountability, to the public and the judiciary as an
institution as a means of strengthening impartial judicial decisionmaking.
Gordon Bermant and Russell R. Wheeler review different meanings of
judicial independence, the perceived threats to independence, and the
soundness of the premise that administrative independence is a
necessary condition for the exercise of decisional independence in their
article, "Federal Judges and the Judicial Branch: Their Independence
and Accountability.'2 4 They suggest that judges' concerns over loss of
independence result from increased federal jurisdiction and workload.
Bermant and Wheeler suggest that judges perceive these changes as*
jeopardizing the historical prestige and quality of the federal bench.
The symposium would not be complete without a discussion of federal
judges who are not within the judiciary. Richard B. Hoffman and Frank
P. Cihlar consider the status of two kinds of federal judges who clearly
lack Article III protections: (1) administrative law judges (in the
executive branch) and (2) Article I judges (who are "legislative" federal

21, Id at 733.
22. Barry Friedman & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Fragmentationof FederalRules, 46
MERCER L. REv. 757 (1995).
23. James Zagel & Adam Winkler, The Independence ofJudges, 46 MERCER L. REV. 795
(1995).
24. Gordon Bermant & Russell R. Wheeler, FederalJudges and the JudicialBranch:
Their Independence and Accountability, 46 MERCER L. REv. 835 (1995).
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judges without life-tenure). In "Judicial Independence: Can It Be
Without Article III?M they argue for expanding independence of these
administrative law and Article I judges and for broadening the selection
process for both kinds of administrative judges as a means of increasing
the independence for those judges serving without life-tenure. If their
prescriptions are followed, these judges will more closely resemble
Article II judges-at least with respect to judicial independence.
As we enter the third century of this country with the judiciary as an
independent branch of government, this symposium on federal judicial
independence provides a time to reflect on the importance of maintaining
and strengthening the independence of the federal judiciary as a means
of improving the American system of government and its democracy. As
one judge recently noted: "this symposium may demonstrate to the other
branches that impingement on our independence may not always rise to
a constitutional 'offense,' but can be quite an impediment to justice."m
It is a testament to the vitality of federal judicial independence that
Mercer publishes this symposium. Judges are naturally concerned with
protecting such a constitutional value, but they are interested for
reasons outside themselves. History has demonstrated that a judiciary
not beholden to the political whims of the times preserves the rule of
law. In conclusion, one judge recently articulated what many believe:
The independence of the federal judiciary is intact today. Federal
judges regularly decide cases without being subjected to external
pressures from other branches of government, or effective coercion by
societal elements in general. Furthermore, orders of the court are
regularly respected and enforced, probably in large part because of the
independence and impartiality of the judiciaryY
Chief Justice Jay would be gratified.

25. Richard B. Hoffman & Frank P. Cihlar, JudicialIndependence: Can It Be Without
Article HI?, 46 MERCER L. REV. 863 (1995).
26. Letter of May 23, 1994, from Judge James A. Redden (D. Or.) to Judge Randall R.
Rader (Fed. Cir.). This letter is on file with the author in the records of the Judicial
Conference Committee on the Judicial Branch Subcommittee on Judicial Independence.
27. Letter of June 1, 1994, from Judge Fred I. Parker (2d Cir.) to Judge Randall R.
Rader (Fed Cir.). The letter is on file with the author in the records of the Judicial
Conference Committee on the Judicial Branch Subcommittee on Judicial Independence.

